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Abstract—X-ray baggage security screening is widely used to
maintain aviation and transport security. Of particular interest
is the focus on automated security X-ray analysis for particular
classes of object such as electronics, electrical items and liquids.
However, manual inspection of such items is challenging when
dealing with potentially anomalous items. Here we present a dual
convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture for automatic
anomaly detection within complex security X-ray imagery. We
leverage recent advances in region-based (R-CNN), mask-based
CNN (Mask R-CNN) and detection architectures such as Reti-
naNet to provide object localisation variants for specific object
classes of interest. Subsequently, leveraging a range of established
CNN object and fine-grained category classification approaches
we formulate within object anomaly detection as a two-class
problem (anomalous or benign). While the best performing
object localisation method is able to perform with 97.9% mean
average precision (mAP) over a six-class X-ray object detection
problem, subsequent two-class anomaly/benign classification is
able to achieve 66% performance for within object anomaly
detection. Overall, this performance illustrates both the challenge
and promise of object-wise anomaly detection within the context
of cluttered X-ray security imagery.
Index Terms—anomaly detection, object detection, X-ray im-
agery, fine-grained classification
I. INTRODUCTION
X-ray baggage security screening is widely used to maintain
aviation and transport security, itself posing a significant
image-based screening task for human operators reviewing
compact, cluttered and highly varying baggage contents within
limited time-scales. With both increased passenger throughput
in the global travel network and an increasing focus on broader
aspects of extended border security (e.g. freight, shipping
postal), this poses both a challenging and timely automated
image classification task.
To facilitate effective screening, threat detection via scanned
X-ray imagery is increasingly employed to provide a non-
intrusive, internal view of scanned baggage, freight, and postal
items. This produces colour-mapped X-ray images which
correspond to the material properties detected via the dual-
energy X-ray scanning process [1]. While current automatic
threat detection within X-ray security screening concentrates
on material discrimination for explosive-related threats [1],
A B
Fig. 1. X-ray security imagery of exemplar electronics items with a high-
lighted (red box) concealed anomalous region in (A) laptop and (B) toaster.
a growing body of work illustrates the potential of CNN
architectures for broader object based threat detection [2]–
[4]. In both occurrences, threat detection performance must
be characterised by high detection and low false alarm rates
for operational viability.
Within this context, of particular interest are electronics,
electrical items and liquids [5]. Not only do these items come
in many evolving variants but they are additionally packed
in complex and cluttered surroundings leading to a complex
X-ray image interpretation problem.
Whilst existing security scanners use dual-energy X-ray for
materials discrimination, and highlight specific image regions
matching existing threat material profiles [6], [7], the detec-
tion of generalized anomalies within complex items remains
challenging [8] (e.g. Fig. 1).
Within machine learning, anomaly detection involves learn-
ing a pattern or distribution of normality for a given data
source and thus detecting significant deviations from this
norm [9]. Anomaly detection is an area of significant in-
terest within computer vision, spanning biomedical imaging
[10] to video surveillance [11]. In our consideration of X-
ray security imagery, we are looking for abnormalities that
indicate concealment or subterfuge whilst working against a
real-world adversary who may evolve their strategy to avoid
detection. Such anomalies may present (or conceal) themselves
within appearance space in the form of an unusual shape,
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texture or material density (i.e. dual-energy X-ray colour) [12].
Alternatively, they may present themselves in a semantic form,
where the appearance of unfamiliar objects either globally or
locally within the X-ray image [13].
Considering the notable challenge of detecting such subtle
anomalies globally within the image, we instead follow a
human-like approach to illustrate an automated pipeline for
the object-wise screening of such items - focus on locating
the object within the scene (image) first, then determine if the
object is anomalous or not ?
By leveraging recent advances in object detection and clas-
sification in X-ray security imagery [2]–[4], we propose a dual
CNN architecture to firstly isolate liquid and electrical objects
by type and subsequently screen them for abnormalities. The
main contribution of this work is a dual CNN architecture
for object-wise anomaly detection, which jointly leverages
state-of-the-art joint object detection and segmentation [14]
for first stage object localisation and subsequently considers
second stage anomaly detection as a simple two-class CNN
classification problem within cluttered X-ray security imagery.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been a steady increase in research work consid-
ering object based threat detection in X-ray baggage security
imagery. Rogers et al. [1] performs a comprehensive review
of the field, including baggage and cargo imagery. In this
section, we will focus on supervised learning for automated
threat detection and anomaly detection within X-ray security
imagery.
A. Automated Threat Detection in X-ray Imagery
Early work on X-ray security images is based on hand-
crafted features such as Bag-of-Visual-Words (BoVW), which
is applied together with a classifier such as a Support Vector
Machine (SVM), achieving a performance of 0.7 recall, 0.29
precision, and 0.57 average precision [15]. Turcsany et al. [16]
extend the approach by using BoVW with SURF descriptor
and SVM classifier yields 0.99 true positive and 0.04 false
positive rates. Subsequently, BoVW is further evaluated for the
single and dual-view X-ray images [17], with optimal average
precision achieved for firearms (0.95) and laptops (0.98). The
various feature point descriptors within BOVW is explored
thoroughly in the work of [18], where the best the combination
achieves 94.0% accuracy with two classes of firearm detection
using an SVM classifier.
Recent CNN-based deep learning architectures [19]–[22]
have significantly improved the object detection in X-ray
security imaging [4], [23], [24]. Earlier work on CNN in X-ray
imaging [2] explore the use of transfer learning from another
network trained on a classification task. Experiments show that
CNN with transfer learning achieves superior performance,
99.26% on true positive and 4.08% on false positive, only
by fine-tuning the network. Broader experimentation in [4]
empirically proves the superiority of fine-tuned CNNs over
the classical machine learning algorithms.
B. Automated Anomaly Detection in X-ray Imagery
Sterchi et al. [25] show that security officers are able to
detect the abnormality better when they focus on detecting
each object in the bag as benign rather than concentrating
on threat items. By the same analogy, the anomaly detection
algorithms proposed in the field are trained on benign samples
to learn what is normal and tested on both normal and
abnormal images to detect threats.
Prior work on appearance and semantic anomaly detection,
has considered unique feature representation as a critical
component for detection within cluttered X-ray imagery [26].
Early work on anomaly detection in X-ray security imagery
[27], implements block-wise correlation analysis between two
temporally aligned scanned X-ray images. More recently [28],
anomalous X-ray items within freight containers have been
detected using auto-encoder networks, and additionally via the
use convolutional neural network (CNN) extracted features
as a learned representation of normality across stream-of-
commerce parcel X-ray images [26]. Andrews et al. [29]
propose representational-learning for anomaly detection within
cargo container imagery. In a similar vein, the work of [30] fo-
cuses on the use of a novel adversarial training architecture to
detect anomalies based on high reconstruction errors produced
by a generator network adversarially trained on non-anomalous
(benign) stream-of-commerce X-ray imagery only. In follow-
up work, [31] proposes another unsupervised anomaly de-
tection approach, whereby the use of skip connected layer
design allows to train much higher resolution images and
optimising latent space within the discriminator network leads
to significantly better results.
By contrast, here we consider a two-stage approach that
first isolates potential objects of interest within the X-ray
security image, as an object detection and classification prob-
lem (Section III-A), prior to secondary anomaly detection via
application of CNN based image classification (Section III-B).
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
Our dual CNN architecture performs two stages of analysis:-
(a) primary object detection within the X-ray image (Section
III-A); and (b) secondary classification of each detected object
via a two-class, {anomaly, benign}, classification formula-
tion (Section III-B). An overview of our overall dual CNN
architecture is shown in Fig. 2.
A. Detection Strategy
We consider a number of contemporary CNN frameworks
for our primary object detection strategy to explore their
applicability and performance for generalised object detection
within the context of X-ray security imagery. Namely we
consider Faster R-CNN [32], Mask R-CNN [14] and RetinaNet
[33] with internal architectures as illustrated in the Fig. 3.
These are evaluated over a six class object detection and
localisation problem comprising of {bottle, hairdryer, iron,
toaster, mobile, laptop} items packed within cluttered X-ray
security baggage imagery.
Fig. 2. Our dual CNN architecture for object-wise anomaly detection in complex X-ray security imagery.
Faster R-CNN is based on a two-stage internal architecture
[32], as shown in Figure 3(A). The first stage consists of
a Region Proposal Network (RPN) that proposes regions of
interest to a secondary classification stage. The RPN consists
of convolutional layers that generate set of anchors with
different scales and aspect ratios, and predict their bounding
box coordinates together with a probability score denoting
whether the region is an object of interest or background.
Anchors are generated by using a fixed set of nine standard
axis-aligned bounding boxes in three different aspect ratios and
three scales, which are defined at every location of the feature
maps. These features are then fed into objectness classification
and bounding box regression layers. Within the second stage,
the objectness classification layer classifies whether a given
region proposal is an object or a background region while a
bounding box regression layer predicts object localisation, at
the end of the overall detection process.
Mask R-CNN is an extension of the Faster R-CNN archi-
tecture for combined object localisation and instance segmen-
tation of image objects [14]. Mask-RCNN similarly relies on
a region proposals which are generated via a region proposal
network. Mask-RCNN follows the Faster-RCNN model of a
feature extractor followed by this region proposal network,
followed by an operation known as ROI-Pooling to produce
standard-sized outputs suitable for input into a secondary clas-
sifier. The main differences between Mask-RCNN and Faster-
RCNN rely on three factors. Firstly, Mask-RCNN replaces
the ROI-Pooling operation used in Faster-RCNN with an
operation called ROI-Align that allows very accurate instance
segmentation masks to be constructed. Secondly, Mask-RCNN
adds a network head (a small fully convolutional neural
network) to produce the desired instance segmentation, as
in Fig. 3(B). Finally, segmentation and classification label
predictions are decoupled; the mask network head predicts the
instance segmentation independently from the network head
predicting the classification label for the object that is being
segmented.
RetinaNet is a one-stage object detector proposed by Lin
et al. [33], where the author identified that class imbalance
are the critical reasons why the performance of single stage
detector architectures such as YOLO [34] and SSD [35] lag
behind two-stage detector architectures such as Faster R-CNN
and Mask R-CNN. To improve the performance, RetinaNet
employs a novel loss function called Focal Loss, which allows
it to focus more on class imbalance samples. Using a one-stage
network architecture with Focal Loss, RetinaNet achieves
state-of-the-art performance in terms of accuracy and running
time. Figure 3(C) depicts the overall architecture of RetinaNet,
which is composed of a backbone network and two sub-
networks. The backbone network is responsible for computing
a convolutional feature map using the Feature Pyramid Net-
work (FPN) over an entire input image. Subsequently, the first
subnet performs label classification on the backbones output,
while the second subnet performs convolution bounding box
regression (i.e. localisation). The focal loss is applied as the
loss function as shown in Fig. 3(C).
B. Classification Strategy
After detecting the candidate objects of interest within X-
ray security imagery based on our detection strategy (Sec-
tion III-A), our secondary classification strategy determines
whether the object localised within the image is {anomaly,
benign} as a two-class classification problem.
In doing so, we leverage transfer learning both from a set of
seminal CNN object classification architectures (SqueezeNet
[36], VGG-16 [37], ResNet [20]) pre-trained on ImageNet [38]
following the X-ray classification methodology of [2], and a
CNN architecture specifically designed for fine-grained (i.e.
sub-class) classification tasks [39].
We specifically adopt fine-grained classification for anomaly
detection, where we define benign and anomalous as sub-
categories (sub-classes) of the primary object type detected
(Section III-A). Within the literature, fine-grained classifica-
tion usually aims to distinguish subordinate visual categories
to the main object class such as determining natural categories
such as species of birds [40] [41], dogs [42] and plants [43].
In the case of our {anomaly, benign} classification problem,
the key to successful fine-grained classification lies in devel-
Fig. 3. Architecture of the CNN based detection approaches evaluated: (A)
Faster R-CNN [32] (B) Mask R-CNN [14] (C) RetinaNet [33].
oping an automated method to accurately identify informative
regions in an anomalous item, and whether each such region
belongs to an anomalous region or benign region of the overall
object.
However, labelling the discriminate regions requires sig-
nificant manual annotation and is therefore difficult to scale
effectively. To avoid this issue, we specifically utilise fine-
grained classification learning a discriminative filter bank
within a CNN framework in an end-to-end manner without
the need for explicit additional object annotation [39]. This
approach enhances mid-level representational learning within
the CNN architecture, by learning a set of convolution filters
such that each is initialised and discriminatively trained in
order to capture highly discriminative sub-image patches.
Based on the the VGG-16 network architecture [37], filters are
additionally added at the 10th convolutional layer representing
image patches as small as 92× 92 with a stride of 8 [39].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we introduce the dataset, evaluation criteria
and CNN training details used in this work.
A. Dataset
We construct our dataset using single-view conventional X-
ray imagery with associated false colour materials mapping
from dual-energy [44]. Our X-ray images consist of benign
and anomalous items, such as a laptop, mobile, toaster, iron,
hairdryer and bottle. To introduce anomalies, we insert marzi-
pan, screws, metal plates, knives and alike inside these objects
as depicted in Fig. 1. All X-ray imagery is gathered locally
used a Gilardoni dual-energy X-ray scanner (FEP ME 640
AMX, [45]).
Each of the anomalous items is placed inside various
cluttered baggage items, which cover the full range and di-
mensions found in aviation cabin baggage, ensuring the set of
bags is a good representation of such items typically presented
at the aviation checkpoint security. In total, the number of X-
ray images after scanning of each bags is 3534 images.
B. Evaluation Criteria
For object detection, the performance of the models is
evaluated by mean average precision (mAP), as used in the
seminal object detection benchmark work of [46]. In order to
calculate mAP, we calculate the area of intersection over union
for the given ground truth and detected bounding box for each
detection as:
Ψ(Bgti , Bdti) =
Area(Bgti ∩Bdti)
Area(Bgti ∪Bdti)
(1)
where Bgti and Bdti are ground truth and detected bounding
box for detection i, respectively. Assuming each detection
as unique, and denoting the area as Ψ(Bgti , Bdti), we then
threshold it by the range of θ = .50 : .05 : .95 giving the
logical bi, where:
bi =
{
1, θmin < Ψ(Bgti , Bdti) < θmax
0, ai < θmin.
(2)
Given both true positive and false positive as ti and fi, where:
ti =ti−1 + bi
fi =ti−1 + (1− bi)
(3)
The precision pi and recall ri curves can be calculated as:
pi =
ti
ti + fi
ri =
ti
np
(4)
where np is the number of positive samples. We can calculate
average precision (AP) based on the area under the curve of
precision versus recall:
AP =
nd∑
i
pi 4 r (5)
Subsequently, we can get the value of mAP by averaging AP
values for all classes, C:
mAP =
1
C
C∑
c=1
APc (6)
For anomaly detection via classification, our model perfor-
mances are evaluated in terms of Accuracy (A), Precision (P),
Recall (R), F-score (F1%), True Positive (TP%), and False
Positive (FP%).
TABLE I
OBJECT DETECTION RESULTS FOR FASTER R-CNN, MASK R-CNN AND RETINANET FOR DUAL CNN ARCHITECTURE. CLASS NAMES INDICATES
CORRESPONDING AVERAGE PRECISION (AP) OF EACH CLASS, AND MAP INDICATES MEAN AVERAGE PRECISION OF THE CLASSES.
Model Networkconfiguration
Average precision mAPBottle Hairdryer Iron Toaster Mobile Laptop
Faster R-CNN [32] ResNet101 96.7 97.5 98.0 98.2 96.4 97.3 97.4ResNet50 95.5 96.4 97.6 94.0 94.3 96.8 95.8
Mask R-CNN [14] ResNet101 99.4 92.2 100.0 100.0 96.5 99.6 97.9ResNet50 97.8 90.8 99.9 99.6 95.5 98.3 96.9
RetinaNet [33] ResNet101 95.2 99.2 98.6 98.5 97.7 86.7 95.9ResNet50 98.3 98.6 98.9 96.7 87.5 88.5 94.8
CBA
Laptop Laptop
Fig. 4. Exemplar image cases where RetinaNet (C) fails to detect an object (laptop in blue dashed box) in X-ray image, while Faster R-CNN (A) and Mask
R-CNN (B) are able to detect the object.
TABLE II
ANOMALY CLASSIFICATION VIA VARYING CNN ARCHITECTURES (SQUEEZENET, VGG, AND RESNET) WITH AND WITHOUT THE PRE-LOCALIZATION
OFFERED BY THE PROPOSED DUAL CNN ARCHITECTURE.
Object Detection Model Network configuration A P R F1 TP(%) FP(%)
Dual CNN
(pre-localization)
Classification via CNN
ResNet18 0.66 0.67 0.58 0.30 58.11 26.56
ResNet50 0.66 0.67 0.59 0.63 59.25 27.67
SqueezeNet 0.59 0.57 0.77 0.57 76.86 57.16
VGG-16 0.59 0.74 0.75 0.56 74.51 55.31
Classification via Fine-Grained VGG-16 0.64 0.62 0.70 0.66 70.00 58.00
Full Image
(no localization) Classification via CNN
ResNet18 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.50 58.19 43.42
ResNet50 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.58 61.24 42.81
SqueezeNet 0.58 0.72 0.27 0.53 26.76 10.36
VGG-16 0.52 0.53 0.23 0.43 22.86 19.08
C. Training Details
In our experiments, we use the CNN implementation of
[47] for our primary object detection approach. Our models
are trained on a GTX 1080Ti GPU, optimised by Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) with a weight decay of 0.0001, the
learning rate of 0.0 and termination at 180k iterations.
The ResNet50 and ResNet101 [20] are used as a network
backbone for detection. When using ResNet101 as the back-
bone, we drop the learning rate by half and double the
length of the training schedule to facilitate training within the
memory footprint of the available GPU. We split the datasets
into training (60%), validation (20%) and test sets (20%) such
that each split has similar class distribution. We also perform
scaling and horizontal flipping to each sample to augment the
datasets during training. All experiments are initialised with
ImageNet pre-trained weights for their respective model [48].
For Faster R-CNN and Mask R-CNN, the batch size is set to
512 for the RPN.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results are presented for each states of our dual CNN
architecture:- (a) primary object detection (Table I); and (b)
secondary classification of each detected object via two-class,
{anomaly, benign}, classification (Table II)
A. Object Detection Results
Table I presents object detection results for six object types
(classes) using Faster R-CNN, Mask R-CNN and RetinaNet
applied to the X-ray security imagery dataset outlined in
Section IV-A. The highlighted AP/mAP signifies the maximal
results obtained for each object class.
However, there are where certain CNN based detection fails
to classify threats, i.e., RetinaNet fails to detect laptop (as
illustrated in Fig. 4C), while Faster R-CNN and Mask R-CNN
can detect the laptop with high confidence (Figs. 4A and 4B).
Overall, the Mask R-CNN architecture gives superior perfor-
mance, with a ResNet101 backbone network giving superior
performance across all architectures. The Mask R-CNN with
ResNet101 yields the highest mAP of 97.9% which establishes
Faster R­CNN Mask R­CNN RetinaNet
.
Fig. 5. Examples of detection and classification of anomalous objects in X-ray security imagery using Faster R-CNN, Mask R-CNN and RetinaNet.
a new benchmark for object instance segmentation within X-
ray security imagery.
B. Anomaly Detection Results
Table II presents a side-by-side comparison of our secondary
anomaly detection strategy (Section III-B) operating on objects
that have been pre-localized (segmented) via our earlier object
detection approach (dual CNN, Table II – upper) against
a simplistic approach of processing the full X-ray image
containing the object without any prior object localization
(full image, Table II – lower). Our use of the proposed fine-
grain classification approach is additionally presented for the
former case, where it represents a fine-grained sub-object
classification problem.
From Table II we can observe superior performance in terms
of statistical accuracy (A), precision (P), recall (R) and true
positive (TP) with the dual CNN architecture that offers pre-
localization of the objects from the image. This observation
demonstrates that dual CNN model can satisfactorily leverage
the mutual benefits of the two complementary networks. By
having object localisation in the first stage, it effectively makes
the feature representation more meaningful (i.e. focused) for
the secondary {anomaly, benign} classification task.
However, despite this success, we additionally note a high
number of false positives (FP) presented across the Table II.
Interestingly, the lowest FP comes from a full image rather
than a dual CNN processing pipeline (albeit with lower overall
performance than others).
Qualitative examples of the detection and classification of
the various objects are presented in Fig. 5. Our approach
benefits from the performance of some classes which usually
easy to distinguish by size and shape (e.g. hairdryer) while
performance is lessor on smaller items, as shown in Table I.
Overall, these results illustrate the challenge of anomaly
detection within X-ray security imagery at both an image or
object level.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we evaluate the effectiveness of dual CNN
architecture for anomaly detection in the multiple-class item,
{bottle, hairdryer, iron, toaster, mobile, laptop} in cluttered
X-ray security imagery. We focus on two sub-problems: firstly,
to leverage recent advances object detection to provide object
localisation of threat item and secondly, leveraging established
CNN and fine-grained classification to determine anomaly or
benign objects. Experimentation demonstrates that fine-tuning
of Mask R-CNN with ResNet101 for X-ray imagery yields
97.9% mAP for the first stage of object detection. However,
while experimental results on secondary anomaly detection
via a two-class classification problem, {anomaly, benign}
show the benefits of a dual CNN architecture (TP: 76.86%
Accuracy: 66%) false positive detection remains a significant
issue (FP >10%). Overall this illustrates the challenges of
considering anomaly detection as an object-wise classification
problem, even with recent advances in object detection
within X-ray security imagery [4], remain significant when
considering existing non-specialised CNN architectures for
this task.
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